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DECEMBER 19, 1984-A BIG DAY IN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Michael R. Gardner*
At an Open Meeting of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC
or Commission) held on December 19, 1984, three of potentially the most
significant telecommunications regulatory issues to arise in the last few de-
cades were addressed. The three landmark actions taken by the Commission
at the meeting include: (1) revision of the "7-7-7 rules," which for over
thirty years have restricted ownership of broadcast properties to seven televi-
sion stations (no more than five of which can be VHF), seven AM, and seven
FM stations;' (2) adoption of a new cost-based plan for telephone access
charges that will establish a monthly residential subscriber line charge of one
dollar beginning June 1985, increasing to two dollars in June 1986;2 and (3)
issuance of a Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking that may serve as
the predicate to authorization of separate satellite systems to compete with
the 108 nation INTELSAT global system.3
Collectively, the FCC's actions in these three dockets are likely to be
viewed in the future as among the most far-reaching and important regula-
tory changes initiated at any one time during the agency's fifty year history.
While the ultimate impact of the Commission's actions will depend on the
manner in which industry and government, both in the United States and
abroad, implement these regulatory changes, there is every indication that,
* Michael R. Gardner heads the Communications Law Section at Akin, Gump, Strauss,
Hauer & Feld. The firm's clients include many of the interested parties involved in the dockets
discussed in this article. In addition to his duties at Akin, Gump, Mr. Gardner served as
Deputy General Counsel for Communications for the Reagan/Bush Presidential Committee in
1984 and as Ambassador and Head of the United States Delegation to the Plenipotentiary
Conference of the International Telecommunications Union in Nairobi, Kenya in 1982. Mr.
Gardner is also Chairman of the Board of the United States Telecommunications Training
Institute.
1. See Amendment of Section 73.3555 of the Commission's Rules Relating to Mutliple
Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broadcasting Stations, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, Gen. Docket No. 83-1009 (1985), 50 Fed. Reg. 4666 (1985) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R.
§ 73) [hereinafter cited as Revision of Multiple Ownership Rule].
2. MTS and WATS Market Structure, Dedication and Order, CC Docket No. 78-72
(1984), 49 Fed. Reg. 50,413 (1984) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. § 69).
3. Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, Notice
of Inquiry and Proposed Rule Making, CC Docket No. 84-1299 (Jan. 4, 1985).
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for better or worse, the telecommunications industry will never again be the
same.
I. MULTIPLE OWNERSHIP
In the area of broadcasting, the Commission reached a final compromise,
at its December 19 meeting, in the highly contentious 7-7-7 rulemaking. Ini-
tially, the Commission adopted an Order on July 26, 1984 that would have
eliminated all ownership restrictions on broadcast properties by 1990.'
Under the original Order, until 1990, a single entity would have been permit-
ted to own twelve AMs, twelve FMs, and twelve TVs (with no distinction
between UHF and VHF stations). However, in response to congressional
pressure and numerous petitions for reconsideration filed by parties con-
cerned about network dominance, the Commission retreated from its com-
plete deregulatory approach. Instead, the Commission adopted a twelve
station VHF limit with an additional cap of 25% on the television audience
reach of any single broadcast entity.5
As a result of the revised multiple ownership rules,6 radical changes may
now occur in the broadcast marketplace if large and small group station
owners propel themselves-through mergers, joint ventures, and acquisi-
tions-towards the new twelve station limit for VHF properties. Under the
new rules, the networks will be authorized to acquire additional VHF sta-
tions. Given their existing holdings, however, they will only be able to ac-
quire one or two major market VHFs, while most other group station
owners will be in a position to acquire seven or more of these broadcast
industry jewels.7
While the new rule is straightforward, the political machinations that led
to adoption of this compromise could provide the basis for a best-selling
novel. The fight over the 7-7-7 rule began indirectly, more than three years
ago, when the then newly appointed FCC Chairman Mark Fowler at-
4. Report and Order, Gen. Docket No. 83-1009, FCC 84-350, 49 Fed. Reg. 31,877
(1984), appeal docketed sub nom. Black Citizens for Fair Media v. FCC, No. 84-1503 (D.C.
Cir. filed Oct. 9, 1984).
5. See Revision of Multiple Ownership Rule, supra note 1.
6. The multiple ownership rule devised on reconsideration has no sunset date. Further-
more, in calculating the audience reach any group station owner attains, UHF and minority-
controlled stations receive a discount. Id.
7. Calling broadcast properties "jewels" is not an overstatement, as is evidenced by re-
cent purchase prices. For example, in 1982, Metromedia paid $220 million for a VHF station
in Boston. Two UHF stations in the ninth and tenth largest markets recently captured a
collective price of $125 million. Currently, Capital Cities Communications, Inc. plans to sell
its Buffalo and New Haven television stations valued at $25 million and $100 million respec-
tively. Wash. Post, Mar. 21, 1985, at B2, col. 4.
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tempted to modify a little noted rule called the Prime Time Access Rule
(PTAR). s That rule requires network-owned or affiliated stations in the fifty
largest markets to air one-half hour of nonnetwork produced programming
during prime-time (usually between 7:30 and 8:00 p.m.).
In 1981, the deregulation-oriented Chairman Fowler viewed the PTAR as
an unnecessary rule that no longer served the public interest. Proponents of
the PTAR, however, including the National Association of Television Pro-
gram Executives (NATPE), Group W, and a diverse coalition of television
industry officials, joined together to demonstrate that the PTAR effectively
addressed a continuing problem of network dominance. Despite an intensive
lobbying effort by network representatives for repeal of the rule, the majority
of FCC Commissioners decided informally that retention of the PTAR
would serve the public interest by maintaining a modest window of prime
time to be filled by programming selected by individual local stations instead
of by their networks.
No sooner had the PTAR skirmish concluded than Chairman Fowler ini-
tiated a docket to eliminate the PTAR's two sister regulations, the Financial
Interest and Syndication rules, commonly known as the "FISR." These
rules, promulgated in 1970, were an attempt to check the abusive exercise of
network market power over independent programmers by precluding net-
work syndication or any financial ownership interest in independently pro-
duced programming.9 In 1977 and 1980, these rules were further codified by
the Department of Justice (DOJ) in Consent Decrees that terminated anti-
trust litigation between the DOJ and each network.10
From early 1982 through 1984, a bitter fight raged between the networks,
which supported total repeal of the FISR, and a diverse coalition from the
television industry which opposed the abolishment of the FISR. The coali-
tion, known as the Committee for Prudent Deregulation, had among its
members major Hollywood studios, the trade guilds (Screen Actors, Direc-
tors, Producers and Writers), independent television stations, and television
celebrities such as Mary Tyler Moore, Alan Alda, Jean Stapleton, Henry
8. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1984).
9. Basically, the Financial Interest Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j)(ii) (1984), prohibits the
networks from acquiring any financial or other proprietary right or interest in programs pro-
duced by entities other than the network itself except the license or other exclusive right to
network exhibition within the United States. The Syndication Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.6580)(i)
(1984), prohibits networks from selling or syndicating reruns of programs initially aired on a
network for later nonnetwork exhibition.
10. United States v. American Broadcasting Companies, 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
64,150 (C.D. Cal. 1980); United States v. CBS, Inc., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63,594 (C.D.
Cal. 1980); United States v. National Broadcasting Co., 1978-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,855
(C.D. Cal. 1977).
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Winkler, Charlton Heston, and Norman Lear. The thrust of the coalition's
argument was that these rules were needed to help control the continuing
problem of network dominance in the broadcasting industry.
The survival of the FISR became a life or death matter for the creative
community and television industry that had prospered under its rules. Sup-
porters of the FISR argued that the rules were essential to preserve creative
flexibility in the broadcasting industry. Without the FISR, this diverse coa-
lition argued that the networks would be even more reluctant to license once
revolutionary programs like "All in the Family," "The Jeffersons" or "Hill
Street Blues." But proponents of total repeal claimed there was no legiti-
mate public interest concern involved. Instead, they argued that the issue
was one of big dollars, and as long as the FISR remained, the networks
would be denied vital revenues to sustain commercial television. In the end,
despite tenacious efforts by the networks and the FCC Chairman, bipartisan
leadership in Congress finally became involved in the FCC process and
forced a moratorium on repeal of the FISR."1
It was in this climate that the FCC decided to move forward to modify the
7-7-7 rule with a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking issued on October 20,
1983.12 Several members of the Commission, particularly Commissioner
Mimi Weyforth Dawson, had argued for several years that the 7-7-7 rule
should be considered prior to any other sweeping broadcast deregulatory
efforts, because regulation of ownership plays a key role in determining the
basic competitiveness of the industry.
While the 7-7-7 rule is technically distinct from the FISR and the PTAR,
the Commission heard many of the same public interest arguments before
modifying the 7-7-7 rule. Primarily, consumers and Congress asked whether
the marketplace was sufficiently competitive in 1984 to allow repeal of nu-
merical ownership limits for VHF television properties. Under the 7-7-7
rule, the networks each currently own five major market VHF stations
reaching approximately 20% of the national audience. Critics argued that
the substitution of a 12-12-12 rule without a market reach standard, as ini-
11. On October 19, 1983, the Senate Appropriations Committee, by a 16-13 vote, adopted
an amendment to the FY 84 Supplemental Approprations bill precluding the FCC from re-
pealing or modifying the rules through May 31, 1984. By a 57-32 vote, the bill was approved
by the full Senate on October 27, 1983. Then, on November 2, 1983, witnesses from the White
House, and the Departments of Commerce and Justice testified before the Senate Commerce
Committee in support of a two-year moratorium on the rules. In the face of this pressure, on
November 16, 1983, Chairman Fowler agreed to delay a decision on the rules until at least
May 10, 1984.
12. In the Matter of Amendment of §§ 73.35, 73.240 and 73.636 of the Commission's
Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of AM, FM, and Television Broadcast Stations, Notice
of Proposed Rule Making, Gen. Docket No. 83-1009 (released Oct. 20, 1983).
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tially proposed by the FCC's Order, could have permitted each network to
reach as many as 35% of the country's television viewers.
As already noted, the issue of network dominance had been addressed
throughly in both the FISR and PTAR controversies. Both the Commission
and Congress were, therefore, already highly sensitized to arguments that
relaxing the 7-7-7 rule could exacerbate network dominance. In this con-
text, it was perhaps predictable that the new 12-12-12 rule advocated by
Chairman Fowler instantly was challenged by bipartisan leadership in Con-
gress. After months of formal as well as behind-the-scenes discussions, on
December 19, 1984, the Commission modified the 12-12-12 rule. The 7-7-7
rule finally was relaxed by allowing any broadcast group to acquire as many
as twelve VHF television properties as long as its market penetration does
not exceed 25%.13
The adoption of the 12-12-12 rule has electrified the broadcast market-
place. Wall Street analysts, passive investors, existing group owners, and
previously disinterested corporations are now taking an aggressive interest in
the broadcasting industry and the new opportunities for competition created
by the Commission's action. Most recently, on March 18, 1985, Capital Cit-
ies Communications, Inc. announced that it had agreed to purchase Amer-
cian Broadcasting Companies, Inc. for $3.5 billion. 14 Additionally, Taft
Broadcasting, currently the owner of seven stations reaching 6.73% of the
national audience (incorporating UHF discounts) plans to acquire Gulf
Broadcasting, a group owning five television and several radio stations for
the price of $755 million. Together, the twelve television stations will have
an audience reach of 11.25%. Rumors abound of mergers and takeovers
involving the two remaining networks. Other group owners, such as The
Wall Street Journal and other media, "tout" the greatly enhanced value of
broadcast properties as a result of the FCC's relaxation of the 7-7-7 rule.
In light of this activity, it seems likely that the action taken by the Com-
mission on the 7-7-7 rule will lead to a dramatically restructured broadcast
marketplace. Will the networks still dominate? Probably, yes. Neverthe-
less, the enlightened deregulatory approach represented by the multiple
ownership compromise could diminish network dominance as alternative
mini-networks grow in size and programming capability. For programmers,
distributors, station owners, and especially the American television viewer,
13. Revision of Multiple Ownership Rule, supra note 1.
14. Wash. Post, Mar. 19, 1985, at Al, cols. 1-2. Prior to approving the merger, the FCC
will require the new company to sell at least one of its 12 television stations. Presently, the
combined holdings of ABC and Capital Cities reach approximately 28% of the market. Wash.
Post, Mar. 21, 1985, at BI, col. 5. To comply with the new 12-12-12 rule, the audience reach
must be reduced to 25%.
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the outcome of this deregulatory action portends important and encouraging
developments for a society that is fixated on its television tube.
II. ACCESS CHARGES
The second momentous Commission development on December 19, 1984,
is one that has long-term implications for all American consumers. The
Commission, with implicit congressional approval (or at least tolerance), im-
plemented a scheme of monthly subscriber line charges for the telephone
industry. Although this proceeding was not as colorful as the broadcast pro-
ceeding, where leaders of the creative community articulated a public inter-
est standard to federal decisionmakers, the Commission's action in the
access docket is just as important. The access decision represents the culmi-
nation of an important stage in a six-year effort to shift the telephone indus-
try from a pricing structure that may have been appropriate in the by-gone
era of monopoly-but no longer sustainable in an era of competitive alterna-
tives-to a more cost-based structure mandated by current technologies and
economic forces.
The essential feature of the December 19 access decision 5 is a change in
the manner of recovery of certain fixed costs ("nontraffic sensitive" or "NTS
costs") associated with the provision of basic telephone service-essentially
those costs incurred in running copper wire pairs between telephone com-
pany local switches and every home and office in the country. These NTS
costs are incurred by the telephone company in making telephone service
available, and do not vary according to amount or nature of that use (i.e.
local or long distance, intrastate or interstate).
Traditionally, the portion of NTS costs assigned to the FCC's jurisdic-
tion16 was recovered on a usage sensitive basis in interstate long distance
telephone rates. Essentially, the cost of local telephone service was being
subsidized by long distance rates. One consequence of this type of recovery
was that high volume users of long distance service paid an amount that may
have been in excess of their share of the relevant costs. Conversely, low
volume toll callers may have contributed much less than the actual cost of
15. Among the other key provisions of the FCC's December 19 recommendations were:
(1) a $1 residential and single line business access charge the first year, beginning June 1985,
and a $2 second year charge pending FCC review in late 1986; (2) an alternative tariff that can
be financed by a surcharge of up to 35 cents on all subscribers in a study area; (3) the establish-
ment of high-cost assistance for small telephone companies; and (4) permitting a waiver of the
subscriber line charge if states reduce their local rates by an equivalent amount.
16. Costs are allocated between the state and federal jurisdictions according to a process
called jurisdictional separations. Until recently, NTS costs were allocated to the federal juris-
diction according to a formula that resulted in an ever-increasing federal allocation of those
costs.
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providing service to them. From a public policy standpoint, this pricing sys-
tem achieved the desired result of making basic telephone service available to
everyone at a price below the cost of providing the service.
As long as high volume users had no alternative but to rely on the basic
telephone network for service, this type of subsidy scheme was sustainable.
However, in an environment where such users have alternatives, whether
self-provided or from other carriers, such a subsidy system necessarily will
unravel in undesirable ways--chiefly in a spiral of increasing rates for those
left on the system (mainly residential users and small businesses), as the
large users with alternatives abandon or bypass the system. It was in re-
sponse to this potential exodus (already underway to a significant extent)
documented in the FCC's record that the Commission decided to impose the
subscriber line charge.
This landmark Order, which was also extremely contentious in its devel-
opment, modifies a previous FCC decision that was viewed by highly vocal
consumer groups and leaders in Congress as "too much too soon." The
original access plan called for an access charge of two dollars per month per
residential telephone, increasing to five to six dollars per month in six
years.17 While the industry largely supported the concept of access charges,
it became clear that the American public, or at least some of its spokesper-
sons and representatives, would rebel if the FCC's original plan were
adopted. As a result, Congress participated actively in the development of a
modified access charge plan designed to achieve the Commission's deregu-
latory goals. At the same time, the modified plan prevents what was viewed,
at least by some in Congress, as the potential for drastic financial disruption
to the residential and commercial telephone user.
The compromise access decision adopted by the Commission at its De-
cember 19, 1984 meeting appears at this time to be acceptable generally to
both Congress and the public at large. Statements from Capitol Hill suggest
that some concerns remain-principally involving the cost of service for eld-
erly, poor and rural consumers. Both the Commission and a Joint Board of
Federal and State Commissioners are continuing to examine these issues in
the hope that a further confrontation with Congress can be avoided.
The long-term significance of the access decision is that it moves this
country toward a truly cost-based telephone system, as opposed to perpetu-
ating a system where local service is subsidized artificially by long distance
rates. As this goal is achieved, together with the evolving implications of the
divestiture of AT&T, the entire structure of the basic telephone industry is
undergoing a massive transformation.
17. MTS and WATS Market Structure, supra note 2.
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III. SEPARATE SATELLITE SYSTEMS
The final major issue addressed by the Commission at its December 19,
1984 Open Meeting involved the authorization of separate satellite systems
to compete for the first time with INTELSAT. Based on a November 28,
1984 Presidential Determination concluding that such systems are in the
"national interest,""8 the Commission adopted a Notice of Inquiry and Pro-
posed Rulemaking19 that may turn out to be the regulatory predicate to the
licensing of private satellite systems.
INTELSAT was the outgrowth of a visionary United States initiative to
share with the rest of the world its then exclusive satellite technology. To-
day INTELSAT is a successful non-profit cooperative, comprised of 108
countries, that provides satellite communications to more than 170
countries.
The genesis of INTELSAT can be traced to the adoption of the Commu-
nications Satellite Act of 1962.20 Following enactment of this legislation, the
United States set out to advance its political, commercial, and humanitarian
goals by convincing its allies to join in an effort to establish a global satellite
system that would help both the industrial world as well as the then fast-
growing community of developing countries.
Originally, as only a nine nation consortium in 1964,21 INTELSAT made
its services available to the developing world through global average pricing.
A mandate, as codified in Articles III and V of the INTELSAT Agree-
ment,22 essentially guaranteed that regardless of technological develop-
ments, changes in traffic patterns, or other factors that might point to
deaveraged pricing, INTELSAT's services would be available on a nondis-
criminatory equal cost basis to all the nations of the world. Simply stated,
this requirement for global average pricing means that a call from New York
to London via an INTELSAT satellite costs the same as a call from New
York to Nairobi, Kenya. As a nonprofit consortium, INTELSAT is re-
quired to use its profits to develop and expand satellite technology. Addi-
18. Letter from President Ronald Reagan to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Commerce, Nov. 28, 1984 (discussing separate international communications satellite
systems).
19. Establishment of Satellite Systems Providing International Communications, supra
note 3.
20. 47 U.S.C. §§ 701-744 (1982).
21. It is noteworthy that while INTELSAT membership has grown from its original nine
members to its current 108 nations, Intersputnik, the Soviet Union's competitive alternative to
INTELSAT, has remained stagnant at a thirteen nation membership level. Its membership
consists largely of Soviet Bloc countries which themselves frequently use INTELSAT services.
22. INTELSAT Intergovernmental Agreement, Aug. 20, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 3853, TIAS No.
7532.
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tionally, the system is required to reduce costs of services to all INTELSAT
members, including the United States. Accordingly, in twenty years, IN-
TELSAT has reduced its prices twelve times.
Despite the undisputed success of INTELSAT as an international organi-
zation and provider of telecommunications services, the United States gov-
ernment currently is taking a hard look at whether to permit transatlantic
and interregional satellite systems to compete directly with INTELSAT. On
December 19, 1984, the FCC initiated a comprehensive proceeding that may
well result in the licensing of new satellite systems. According to pending
license applications, none of the proposed systems contemplates service to
remote areas of the world. Instead, the entrepreneurial sponsors of INTEL-
SAT's potential competition propose to serve only those highly trafficked
and therefore, highly lucrative routes currently served by INTELSAT. Pro-
ponents of these systems, including the Reagan Administration, argue that
the licensing of these systems is in the "national interest" since competition
will be promoted by the entry of new private satellite systems serving dis-
crete routes. However, with the exception of the United States,23 INTEL-
SAT and its 108 nation members, argue that the prosperity and political
harmony of its global system will be jeopardized if private systems are li-
censed by the FCC. In accordance with the Notice, it is now up to the FCC
to determine what criteria will govern the licensing of the new satellite sys-
tems designed to compete with INTELSAT.
In the INTELSAT docket, unlike the two dockets discussed above, the
FCC is seeking to determine de novo a public interest standard that cannot
be based exclusively on the domestic goal of increased competition in the
telecommunications industry. In view of INTELSAT's global composition,
the FCC seems to be seeking a balance between the important procompeti-
tive goals and the equally important foreign policy goals that INTELSAT
serves.
Since issuing its Notice, the FCC has been contacted by some members of
Congress expressing concern that important foreign policy considerations
may be pushed aside by a Commission focused solely on procompetitive
goals. Others on Capitol Hill have criticized the FCC and the Executive
Branch for moving too slowly to license private satellite systems. Given
these concerns, Congressional hearings have been scheduled on this issue,
once again indicating that Congress may help to shape the ultimate outcome
of the FCC's public interest determination.
23. On January 31, 1985, the Assembly of Parties unanimously adopted a resolution sup-
porting the maintenance of a single global system. The resolution urges parties to refrain from
entering any arrangements that would lead to the establishment of separate international sys-
tems linking the United States and Europe.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Regardless of the outcome of the INTELSAT proceeding, the FCC is
moving ahead and unquestionably has initiated a proceeding that is both as
provocative and important as the FCC's actions in the 7-7-7 rulemaking or
the access charge decision. When one examines the three major decisions
addressed by the Commission at its open meeting, it becomes apparent that
December 19, 1984, was a profound day in the fifty year history of this New
Deal era regulatory body. In one sitting, the Commission initiated a major
restructuring of the domestic broadcasting industry, revamped the pricing
structure for our basic national telephone system, and finally, opened the
door for privately-owned satellites as alternatives to the single global satellite
system that the United States launched twenty years ago.
